Essay by SM Lee Hsien Loong "Microeconomics in Public Policy: A Practitioner's View" (Mar 2026)

Please see below for the Mandarin translation of the English essay.

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Microeconomics in Public Policy: A Practitioner's View*

1. Introduction

One of the most important roles for any government is to grow and maintain a well-functioning economy.

The theories about how best to do so are well-studied, going all the way back to Adam Smith. He explained how the invisible hand of self-interest plus the free market give rise to co-operation between strangers on an economy-wide and even international scale, to produce good outcomes (Smith, 1776).

250 years later, Smith’s insights into human nature and how markets work remain valid and relevant. So much so that Dr. Goh Keng Swee, the architect of Singapore’s modern economy, once said provocatively that “Developing nations need not go beyond Adam Smith for guidance on their economic policies” (Goh, 1972a, p. 456).

Adam Smith envisaged a very limited role for governments. He saw them as only responsible for public institutions that benefit the whole society but are unprofitable for any individual to maintain, such as national defense, the administration of justice (establishing and enforcing property rights), certain types of public infrastructure, basic education for the population and hardly anything else.

This was how societies worked in Adam Smith’s day.

But societies and economies have become vastly more complicated and modern governments have correspondingly expanded their public policy objectives and roles. Most governments deliver a wide range of public services. They promote, regulate and participate in many economic activities. They administer elaborate social, health and education systems. They redistribute income and resources.

Almost by definition, these are areas where the free market does not work well by itself, thus necessitating government intervention. But how should governments best perform these tasks?

One approach is to rely exclusively on non-market means and to perform these tasks directly — creating departments and bureaucracies to do the work themselves, or to regulate and require businesses and individuals to do what the government wants.

Alternatively, governments may create an overall policy framework, but in implementing these policies, use economic laws and market forces to accomplish their objectives.

2. When Designing and Implementing Policies, Use Economic Principles and Market Forces

Singapore has adopted the second, more market-oriented approach.

Ours is not a purist laissez-faire model, where the government does as little as possible.

The Government actively intervenes in many areas to achieve public policy objectives.

But we have adopted the philosophy that when intervening and pursuing these goals, we need to be cognizant of economic laws, market forces and incentives. This way we work with, rather than against, human nature. The better we understand these powerful forces and the more we use them in designing and implementing policies, the more effectively we will achieve our goals.

2.1. Public housing

One example is public housing, a signature policy of the Singapore Government.

Today, around 80% of Singaporeans live in public housing and 90% of Singaporeans own their own homes.

This would never have been achieved had the Government not intervened on a massive scale to acquire large swathes of private land, plan and build public housing, enact elaborate rules and sales conditions to govern how to allocate these flats, and institute systems and policies to make public housing affordable and pervasive home ownership a reality.

Yet in implementing the public housing program, we have recognized economic principles and used market mechanisms to achieve the overall political and social goals of universal home ownership and good quality, affordable public housing for Singaporeans.

For example, we set up the Housing & Development Board (HDB) as a statutory board to build and sell flats, instead of doing this through a government ministry or department.

When HDB needs land to build flats, it has to buy the land from the state at fair market value. This recognizes that there is an opportunity cost to using land for public housing, that land is a scarce resource which has value and that this value can and should be objectively ascertained and costed into the flats. This creates the right price signals and incentives for HDB to make full and optimal use of the land that it takes for public housing.

HDB does not design or build all the flats itself. It designs some of the flats so as to retain core expertise, but tenders out most projects to private sector architects and construction firms. This allows HDB to exploit the flexibility, efficiency and innovation inherent in the private sector operating in a competitive market. It helps HDB keep costs low and deliver value for money.

As flats are built, they are sold to the public. To achieve social objectives such as home ownership, affordability, and social and ethnic integration, HDB imposes restrictions on who can buy the flats and conditions that homeowners must comply with.

But the key question is how to price the flats.

By policy, flats are sold at a discount to their market value, to make them more affordable and to help households build up a nest-egg for retirement.

But not all flats of the same type have identical value. Where the particular unit is located, which direction it faces and which floor it is on, all make a difference.

HDB has to take this market reality into account and price each flat accordingly. Taking its offerings as a whole, HDB can then offer affordable flats for every income group and homebuyers can select a flat matching their preferences and within their budgets. We avoid large and unfair windfall gains accruing arbitrarily to a lucky few, as would happen if all flats of a given type were priced equally.

After the flats are sold, their new owners are required to live in them for a Minimum Occupation Period.

But ownership ultimately means being able to sell one’s flat and perhaps buy another, when one’s life circumstances change.

How should this be done?

We do not want HDB to be the arbiter and administrator of these secondary transactions.

Hence, we do not require flat owners to sell their flats back to HDB and then apply for another flat from HDB. Instead, we allow households to buy and sell their flats on a secondary resale market, at market prices set by willing buyers and sellers. There are still some restrictions and interventions to maintain key social objectives. For example, only citizens and permanent residents can buy resale flats; each household can only own one HDB flat at any given time; the flat must be owner-occupied and may only be fully rented out if tight conditions are met; ethnic ratios at block and precinct levels must still be maintained; and Government provides some subsidies for eligible families. But overall, the restrictions and interventions on resale flats are much less than on new flats.

This approach creates a diversified but interlinked national housing market, ranging from flats bought directly from the HDB at a market discount, to resale HDB flats transacted on the secondary market at market prices but subject to HDB rules, to private property bought and sold more freely. This spectrum gives owners the flexibility to upgrade or downgrade their homes in the course of their lives and enables them to realize the true market value of the flats, while maintaining key social objectives.

2.2. Healthcare

Another example is healthcare.

Most modern societies see healthcare as a key social safety net, a basic need and even a human right. But it is also a vexed subject, famous for market failures arising from information asymmetry, principal–agent problems and misaligned incentives. Left to its own, the healthcare sector will tend to overprescribe, overservice, overconsume and underdeliver.

Developed countries have taken different approaches toward healthcare. At one extreme, the US relies heavily on the free market and private providers for both healthcare delivery and health insurance. But despite its high cost, this has yielded unsatisfactory outcomes.

Access is very unequal and beyond the reach of many households.

At the other extreme, the UK relies heavily on the public sector. The National Health Service delivers nationalized healthcare free at the point of use, paid for by taxpayers. In theory, healthcare is affordable and accessible to all British residents. But in reality, resources are finite and healthcare is rationed through queuing. Waiting times are long, sometimes lasting years, compromising the quality of care and causing considerable dissatisfaction.

There is also little incentive to improve efficiency and trim overheads.

Singapore has developed a hybrid solution that involves both the public and private sectors. It seeks to use economic incentives to produce the desired outcomes.

The Government is the major provider. But it does not deliver care through a government ministry or department. Instead, it has created three autonomous public healthcare clusters, which run 11 acute hospitals and assorted other public healthcare institutions such as polyclinics.

These public providers operate on a not-for-profit basis. They charge fees and receive subsidies, but are required to cover their costs. Their mission is not to maximize profits, but to deliver good quality, cost-effective healthcare to the population while being mindful of the costs. They deliver both unsubsidized and subsidized healthcare, which are distinguished by the right to choose your doctors, creature comforts and waiting times.

However, even for subsidized services, patients always co-pay for at least part of their treatment costs. Nothing is free at the point of use. This is to reflect the value of what they are consuming and to discourage excessive demand for treatments, procedures and prescriptions.

This is a fundamental philosophy that the People’s Action Party Government adopted right from the beginning.

But co-payment can only work if patients can actually afford it. Therefore, the Government created MediSave, a national compulsory health savings scheme which people contribute to and build up during their working years, and which they can draw upon to pay their medical bills. These savings need to be complemented by risk-pooling to protect against unexpectedly large medical bills. Recognizing this, the Government later created MediShield (which became MediShield Life) as a national basic health insurance scheme.

Its essential features include deductibles, co-payments (co-insurance) and claim limits.

These are necessary not only to keep premiums low, but also to reduce the risk of overconsumption common in medical insurance schemes.

The private sector too has a role in Singapore’s healthcare system. Privately-run general practitioner clinics service a large part of the primary healthcare market. Private hospitals offer an alternative to public healthcare institutions for those who prefer more comfort and choice and are willing to pay for it. We have also allowed private medical insurance, including Integrated Shield Plans (IPs) and riders that augment MediShield Life, to provide additional choice to those who wish to enhance their coverage.

But we have not allowed the private sector to run completely unrestrained, because market practices and market failures in private healthcare inevitably impact the public healthcare system. For example, we publish comprehensive fee benchmarks for private hospitals covering common surgical procedures and medical conditions, to enhance price transparency and discourage excessive charging. We have also intervened in the private insurance market to regulate the design of IPs and riders, which are continually at risk of market failure through a vicious spiral of the buffet syndrome, higher claims and higher premiums.

Managing our healthcare system is not a one-off exercise but a dynamic process. The system needs constant tending, especially as it is not a simple single-payer system.

Patients, doctors, healthcare institutions and insurance providers all react to policies and rules, changing their behavior and requiring our policies and rules to adapt again and again.

As our population ages, disease loads and medical needs evolve and so must the healthcare system. At the same time, medical science is constantly inventing novel technologies and treatments. We need to work out how these should be provided, funded and allocated.

Nevertheless, our hybrid approach — combining government and private sector provision, alongside active regulation and the judicious use of pricing and economic incentives, within an overall framework set by the Government — has provided good quality healthcare for Singaporeans, at a lower cost than in most other countries.

2.3. Public sector remuneration

Public housing and healthcare are examples of public services delivered with the help of market forces and incentives.

But the public sector requires inputs from the market economy too. It has to pay for these inputs and is therefore subject to the same economic and market realities as the rest of the economy. For example, when government departments consume water or electricity, they pay the same tariffs and taxes as all other consumers. When officers travel on official duties, they pay the same airfares as other travelers, even on Singapore Airlines, the national carrier.

But the biggest and most important factor input to the public sector is personnel.

Delivering good government and superior public services requires a high-quality public service workforce. This depends on having capable, committed and competent officers at all levels. The public service has to attract, recruit, train, develop and retain such people.

Here, the economic reality is that the public service participates in the national labor market. It competes with many other employers for people with the skills and abilities that it needs. Potential recruits have a choice between public and private sector careers. So do serving officers, especially when the economy is prospering.

We have therefore adopted the policy that the public sector will offer career paths and salaries that are competitive with the private sector. We benchmark public sector salaries to equivalent private sector ones, comparing job scopes, capabilities, contributions and responsibilities.

This applies at all levels, from rank-and-file officers to senior leaders and even political appointees. This is the realistic and effective way to attract and retain good quality public officers. It is a key reason Singapore has been able to build and maintain a clean, competent, committed public service.

Of course, the public service is not another private business. Officers must be imbued with the ethos of public service. They cannot have chosen a government career in the hope of enriching themselves, but their value and contributions must still be properly recognized and fairly rewarded.

In most countries, public service wages are substantially lower than those in the private sector. The basic mindset is that governments cannot afford to pay private sector wages, due to financial and political constraints. To mitigate this, public officers receive benefits-in-kind, such as housing, medical benefits, travel allowances, guaranteed job security or generous pension schemes. But despite these perks, without realistic remuneration, it is hard to sustain the quality of the public service. Too often, corruption becomes an endemic, insoluble problem.

Singapore has largely done away with such perks and instead pays the public service clean but competitive wages.

Perhaps one reason this model is unusual is that it is not easy to execute well in practice.

In the private sector, bottomlines are closely watched and results show up tangibly and fairly quickly. It is not so hard to assess someone’s capability or contributions, pay them what they are worth and let them go if they fail to perform. The public sector lacks the same financial pressures and signals. It deals with many intangible, complex and longer-term issues, where success is not so easy to quantify, and consequences emerge only years later. This makes it much harder to enforce performance discipline like the private sector.

Yet, rigorously assessing and rewarding both individual and organizational performance in the public sector is an essential complement to paying public officers properly. This remains a constant focus for the Singapore Public Service.

3. When Allocating a Scarce Resource, Just Price It

Beyond public housing, healthcare and public service remuneration, economic principles and market incentives are relevant to many other public policies.

One broad area is the use of pricing to allocate scarce resources, rather than having the government decide who needs these resources most.

With most goods and services, this is not controversial. That is how a market economy works — if you buy a handphone, you pay the asking price for whichever brand and model you want. If you need a haircut or a home renovation, you choose a service provider and pay the going price. Even with services by government agencies, for example, the issue of passports or licenses, people generally accept having to pay for the cost of the service.

Where the use of pricing is more argued over is when the scarcity of the resource results from government action. The government may have deliberately limited its supply for some policy reason, as we do with entry to casinos or Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) for cars. This can also happen when the scarce resource is a basic necessity, such as potable water. In such cases, an argument can be made to allocate these resources administratively to those whose needs are most meritorious, instead of through the price mechanism.

Yet even in these situations, often the cleanest, fairest way to allocate the resource is to just price it. The resource then goes to those who really value it the most and not just those who merely say so. We avoid the need to make subjective judgments and elaborate rules on who is more deserving than whom. We also avoid having to police a gray or black secondary market trading the resource. The revealed preferences of consumers will generate the correct price signals to guide production and consumption and enable us to make the most productive use of the resource.

There are limits to this principle, but it is a very good first cut. We have used it in many areas, even some unexpected ones.

3.1. Casino Entry Levy

For example, when we allowed Integrated Resorts (IRs) in Singapore in 2010, which would include casinos among their offerings, our goal was to boost tourism and spur the economy.

Foreigners would naturally enjoy free access to the casinos. But what about Singapore residents?

We did not want to completely ban residents from the casinos. Some local clientele was important for creating the right atmosphere and buzz. Also, residents already had ready access to gambling, for example, in nearby countries or on ships cruising to nowhere.

Casinos located right in the middle of the city would create a more convenient way to gamble, but would not present a radically different risk. Still, we did not want the casinos to give a big boost to gambling locally and worsen problem gambling among the population.

Hence, we decided to restrict the number of residents visiting the casinos. This made casino entry a scarce resource. The question was how to allocate it: who should be allowed entry, who should be excluded and how?

A few cases for exclusion were clear-cut: those on government financial assistance or legal aid; people living in HDB rental flats; undischarged bankrupts; and individuals whose families had obtained exclusion orders against them or who had excluded themselves.

But beyond these groups, there was a long tail of other plausible archetypes to exclude: parents with young children (how young?); low income (how low?); ex-convicts (what type of crimes?).We would have had endless arguments on whether it was fair or necessary to exclude a particular group by fiat and where to draw the line.

We adopted a simple solution: just price it. We explicitly excluded only the few obvious groups. Beyond that, we imposed a Casino Entry Levy on residents, collected by the Government, to discourage but not prevent people from visiting casinos. This avoided arbitrary judgments on who was more vulnerable to problem gambling and who was more “deserving” of the right to visit casinos. At the same time, it effectively limited the number of residents visiting the casinos.

Pricing casino entry has worked well. The IRs are thriving, generating many jobs and significant economic activity. Residents can and do visit the casinos, but there has been no flood. 90% of casino patrons are foreigners (Parliament of Singapore, 2025). The problem gambling rate among residents has remained low and stable at 1% (National Council on Problem Gambling, 2024).

We were probably the first country in the world to adopt this unconventional solution.

Now, Vietnam, Japan, Philippines and the European Union are considering doing the same.

3.2. Certificates of Entitlement

Another area where the Government has deliberately imposed scarcity to achieve a policy objective is vehicle ownership.

Road space in a city-state is inherently scarce. Traffic congestion is a chronic problem.

To keep traffic free-flowing, we decided to directly control the size of the vehicle population through a quota scheme. To buy or own a vehicle, a person or business would need to obtain a Certificate of Entitlement (COE), which is a permit conferring the right to own a vehicle for a fixed number of years.

Once the vehicle population was limited this way, the right to own a vehicle became a scarce and valuable resource. Then the question was: who should get a COE?

One can argue that this scarce resource should be allocated based on an assessment of one’s needs. For example, some people need a motorcycle or car for work, others need a car to ferry young children, elderly parents or disabled family members and companies need vehicles to conduct their business.

The problem is that there are many different needs, each important to that individual. It is very hard for the Government to decide which should warrant special consideration — such decisions are inherently subjective. Further, there is no guarantee that once the right to own a vehicle is allocated to someone who supposedly needs it urgently, he will not on-sell the valuable asset in order to buy something else he in fact needs more.

So we decided to allocate COEs through an auction. This way, the scarce resource goes to those who derive the most value out of it — because they are the ones most willing and able to pay for it, while the Government collects the scarcity value created because the number of COEs issued is limited. This approach also “internalizes the externality”, as economists say, because each additional vehicle on the road increases congestion and imposes additional delays and costs on all other road users, and the COE makes the owner of the additional vehicle bear this cost financially.

This idea traces back to Dr. Goh Keng Swee, who first suggested it in 1972 (Goh, 1972b, p. 480), years before we introduced the COE scheme in 1990. The scheme as implemented has a more complicated design than this simple concept, mainly to make it more politically palatable without undermining its economic logic. But the core idea remains sound and the scheme has kept our traffic free-flowing and prevented the gridlock that plagues many major cities.

3.3. Water

Potable water supplied by the Public Utilities Board (PUB) is an interesting case for different reasons.

It is essential for life — a basic necessity that nobody can live without. At the same time, in Singapore, water is a scarce resource and a strategic and security concern. The cheaper sources — from Johor and our local reservoirs — are already at their capacity limits. Additional supplies have to come from recycling used water (NEWater) or desalination, which are significantly dearer. This creates an upward-sloping supply curve, with the Long-Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) of producing water much higher than the average cost of production. That makes conserving water a national priority.

How should we allocate such a resource?

One way is to tier prices by volume consumed. Set a low price for a basic quantum of water per household, which we treat as its entitlement to a basic necessity. Then charge higher tariffs for consumption beyond this amount to discourage excessive usage. This was what PUB did for many years.

However, determining what the basic quantum should be is subjective and arbitrary. Not all households will need this full entitlement, while some will need more. For most other essentials of life, such as food or clothing, we do not decide how much each household needs. People buy whatever food or clothing they need and are willing to pay for. Second, most households can afford to pay the full price for water; there is no need to offer them a concession price. So, tiered tariffs incur a significant deadweight revenue loss. Third, the water price should incentivize users to conserve water from the first drop, instead of only after a certain amount has been consumed. Tiered tariffs do not achieve this.

Hence, from an economic point of view, the correct approach is to set a flat water price, equal not to the average cost of production but to the full LRMC, which is higher. We then charge all users this same price starting from the first drop they consume, with no tiering of prices.

This will reflect the actual scarcity value of water and create the right financial incentive for all households and businesses to save water however much or little they consume. This also ensures that additional investments to increase the supply of water (through NEWater or desalination) are financially viable and make economic sense.

This is how we price water in Singapore. The water tariff (paid to PUB) reflects the average cost of production to PUB, including the cost of capital. On top of that, users pay a Water Conservation Tax (to the Government), bringing the total price up to the LRMC.

PUB switched to this approach in 1997. It meant tripling water prices within two years.

To make it work politically, we coupled the price increase with a scheme of utilities rebates called U-Save, which provided targeted financial assistance to lower-income households.

U-Save was an integral part of the LRMC pricing policy and was critical to its success.

U-Save is designed to be cash-like. The rebates are credited to the utility bills of households. They can be used to pay not just for water, but also for electricity and other utilities. The quantum depends on the housing type, a proxy for the household’s income, with smaller flats getting larger rebates. But it is independent of the amount of water or electricity actually consumed. If not immediately used up, the balance can be rolled over to the next billing period. Hence, unlike a discounted price of water or electricity, U-Save does not incentivize households to use more water than necessary or to leave their lights on, just to enjoy its benefit.

Overall, this approach has ensured that lower-to-middle-income households are still able to afford this essential good, without distorting the economic incentives around production and consumption of water, which should apply to all.

3.4. Is pricing fair?

One criticism of allocating scarce resources through price is that this is unfair.

It is argued that the affluent always have an advantage, since they are more able and willing to pay for these resources. But this is true not just of casino entry, COEs or water, but of all goods and services bought and sold in a market economy. Yet most governments do not, for the vast majority of goods and services, intervene to replace the free market with a merit- or needs-based approach. This is for good reason. The Communist ideal — from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs — is contrary to human nature and has never worked in practice.

Complete equality of income or wealth is impossible and even not desirable in human societies, though extreme inequality can be a serious problem.

But the way to reduce inequality is not through individual non-price schemes, which administratively allocate each scarce resource to those considered most deserving.

Rather, it is to implement a progressive system of taxation and income transfers and to use the revenues to provide high-quality public goods for all. Better-off households will pay much more in taxes than they receive in government services and benefits, while lower-income households will receive much more from the government than the taxes they pay.

If pricing a particular scarce resource will unduly impact poorer households, the solution is to create more affordable alternatives or provide targeted financial assistance to those who need it.

Thus, while we allocate COEs through an auction, we also offer good alternatives to owning a car: an efficient public transport system and a competitive private hire car and taxi industry. While we charge properly for the scarcity value of water, we also give U-Save rebates to households that need financial help. (There is no need for schemes to help those who cannot afford the Casino Entry Levy.) This way, we preserve the price signals and incentives to guide the production and consumption of each scarce resource or product, keep policies simple and clean and target our assistance more accurately and effectively.

4. When Providing Assistance, Cash or Cash-Like is Better

Helping households cope with higher water prices through U-Save rebates illustrates another basic economic principle: when providing assistance, cash or a cash-like voucher is better than price discounts or assistance-in-kind. Beneficiaries can use the cash or voucher to purchase what they actually value and want to consume, instead of having their needs and entitlements defined for them. This way, we avoid distorting economic incentives and respect the preferences and autonomy of the beneficiaries.

Between cash and cash-like, in theory, cash is the superior choice, because it gives beneficiaries full flexibility to spend on whatever they need most, while costing the government no more than a voucher.

But in practice, cash-like is often better, as with U-Save. This is because a voucher is more mentally salient and retains the psychological link with the purpose of the assistance, especially if the beneficiaries must consciously do something to use the voucher, for example, by clicking in an app. Whereas cash will be co-mingled with the beneficiaries’ other money, making it harder for them to make the connection. They may not remember or even realize that they have received the assistance, especially if it is credited automatically and silently into their bank accounts.

We have applied this principle to other forms of assistance too.

4.1. Goods and Services Tax Vouchers

Goods and Services Tax (GST) Vouchers are a type of government assistance to lower-income households to offset the GST, a consumption tax. The vouchers comprise cash, MediSave top-ups, U-Save rebates and Service and Conservancy Charges rebates.

When we introduced the GST in 1994, we designed it to have a single flat rate of tax, but paired it with GST Vouchers and other measures to lighten its burden on lower-income households. We distributed GST Vouchers again each time the GST rate was subsequently increased. First implemented as a one-off, transient measure, it has since become a permanent scheme.

The alternative approach would have been to implement multiple GST rates, with lower or even zero rates for essential goods and services. Many countries with a GST or value-added tax have done this, because politically it is an easier sell.

But this approach is more expensive and less effective. Most of the tax revenue forgone does not benefit lower-income households, because higher-income households spend more on “essential” goods and services like food and clothing, and are therefore the ones who actually benefit the most from reduced taxes on these items.

Also, with multiple tax rates, the government cannot avoid making arbitrary distinctions and pursuing unproductive litigation as to exactly which goods and services should qualify for a lower rate. If apples and oranges are “essential” fruits (zero-rated), why not avocados (taxed)? Is sushi raw (zero-rated) or cooked (taxed) food? Should an exotic nightclub show (taxed) qualify as performance art (zero-rated)? These are absurd but actual examples.

A single GST tax rate, combined with cash and cash-like transfers, is a far more efficient and effective way to help lower-income households.

4.2. Community Development Council Vouchers

Community Development Council (CDC) Vouchers are another type of cash-like assistance that the Government has provided households to help them with the cost of living.

They can be spent at heartland shops and hawker centers or at supermarkets, but beyond that, we do not prescribe what households can use them for.

These vouchers have proven to be a very popular form of government support.

We regularly receive requests to extend the use of CDC Vouchers to other areas from both individuals and businesses and even requests to replace them with cash grants, but we have not done so. The current range of uses is sufficiently broad for households to spend the vouchers only on things they would have purchased anyway, while being focused enough on groceries and daily necessities to keep a clear link to their cost of living. If the Government distributed cash instead, this link would be lost.

4.3. Community assistance

Community assistance schemes often adopt such an approach too.

In my own constituency, during festive occasions, we used to present hampers to needy households. The hampers included mostly food items like rice, cooking oil and milk powder, things that we thought the beneficiaries would find useful.

But we later realized that not all needy households necessarily needed or valued the same items.

So we decided instead to bring the beneficiaries on shopping trips to the supermarket, give them a budget and help them pay for their selections (alcohol and tobacco excluded) with shopping vouchers.

We discovered that residents far preferred this. They could choose what they really needed and appreciated our gesture far more. An unsentimental economist would say that the deadweight loss of the gift was greatly reduced (Waldfogel, 1993).

We also observed a few residents using some of their vouchers to purchase more expensive items like abalone or bird’s nest, as a small festive treat for themselves. I felt moved and happy for them. We could not have made such choices on their behalf. But they used our gesture of help to obtain something they truly valued and needed. I was glad we had given them the agency to exercise this choice and add some sparkle to their lives.

5. Conclusion

The Singapore Government intervenes heavily to achieve major public policy objectives.

But it also recognizes economic realities and has relied on market forces more than other countries, sometimes in unconventional ways, to achieve social and economic objectives.

This does not mean that only economic considerations matter. Nor should they always take precedence. Governments must balance them against other considerations such as political acceptance, social norms or intangible objectives. For example, National Day Parade tickets are in great demand, but we do not auction them to the highest bidder.

Kidneys for transplantation are scarce too, but we have not legalized trading in human organs. In these two cases, nation-building and ethical qualms trump economic logic.

However, in my experience, the more common problem is governments paying insufficient attention to economic principles and market forces when designing and implementing policies. Only occasionally is the problem the opposite — governments taking too purist an approach in applying economic logic, to the detriment of wider objectives.

This essay does not present any breakthrough in economic theory. Rather, it describes, from a practitioner’s view, how Singapore has applied microeconomic principles to real world situations. In particular, we have found three rules-of-thumb useful: (i) when designing and implementing policies, use economic principles and market forces; (ii) when allocating a scarce resource, just price it; and (iii) when providing assistance to beneficiaries, cash or cash-like is better.

Because Singapore has done this systematically and extensively, we run a smaller government than most. The outcome, whether in terms of growth, equity, social stability or quality of public services, confirms that this is a viable way to achieve not only the economic, but also the social and political goals of the nation.

References

Goh, KS (1972a). Town and gown. In The Essays and Speeches of Goh Keng Swee: The Practise of Economic Growth (1977), KS Goh (ed.), p. 456. Marshall Cavendish International.

Goh, KS (1972b). Zero growth rate for private motor vehicles. In The Essays and Speeches of Goh Keng Swee: The Practise of Economic Growth (1977), KS Goh (ed.), pp. 480–492. Marshall Cavendish International.

National Council on Problem Gambling (2024). Report on survey on participation in gambling activities among Singapore residents, 2023.

Parliament of Singapore (2025). Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 96, Issue or Sitting No. 10, 5 November 2025, Written answer to question section, Question No. 16, 15th Parliament, First Session, sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/#/sprs3topic?reportid=written-answer-20981%23.

Smith, A (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Strahan.

Waldfogel, J (1993). The deadweight loss of Christmas. The American Economic Review, 83(5), 1328–1336.

* This is an Invited Discussion Policy Paper.

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Mandarin translation of the English essay

李显龙：公共政策中的微观经济学：一位实践者的视角

任何政府最重要的职责之一，就是发展和维护一个运作良好的经济体。

关于如何最好地实现这一目标的理论已得到充分研究，且可追溯至亚当·斯密（Adam Smith）。他解释自利这只“看不见的手”加上自由市场，如何促使陌生人在经济乃至国际层面合作，产生良好的结果。

250年后，斯密对人性和市场运作方式的洞察依然有效且具有现实意义。以至于新加坡现代经济的总策划师吴庆瑞博士曾逗趣地说：“发展中国家在制定经济政策时，完全可以以亚当·斯密的理论为指南。”

亚当·斯密设想政府扮演一个非常有限的角色。在他看来，政府仅应负责那些惠及全社会，但对任何个人而言维持起来都不划算的公共事务，例如国防、司法行政（确立和维护财产权）、某些类型的公共基础设施、全民基础教育，除此之外几乎别无其他职责。

这便是亚当·斯密时代社会运作的方式。

但社会和经济已变得异常复杂，现代政府也相应地扩大公共政策目标和角色。大多数政府提供广泛的公共服务。它们促进、监管并参与许多经济活动。它们管理着复杂的社会、医疗和教育体系，并再分配收入和资源。

几乎可以肯定，这些领域单靠自由市场无法良好运作，因此须要政府干预。但政府应如何最好地履行这些任务呢？

一种方法是完全依赖非市场手段直接执行这些任务——设立部门和官僚机构亲自开展工作，或者监管并要求企业和个人执行政府的意愿。

另一种方法是，政府可以创建一个总体政策框架，但在实施这些政策时，利用经济规律和市场力量来实现各种目标。

运用经济原则和市场力量设计和实施政策

新加坡采取了第二种，即更具市场导向的方法。

我们的模式并非纯粹的自由放任（laissez-faire），即政府尽可能少地干预。政府在许多领域积极干预，以实现公共政策目标。

但我们采纳的理念是，在干预和追求这些目标时，我们须要认识到经济规律、市场力量和激励机制。这样一来，我们是顺应而非违背人性行事。我们越了解这些强大的力量，越能在设计和实施政策时加以运用，就越能有效地实现我们的目标。

公共住房

一个例子是公共住房，这是新加坡政府的标志性政策。

如今，约80%的新加坡人居住在公共住房中，90%的新加坡人拥有自己的房屋。如果政府没有大规模干预，征用大片私人土地，规划并建造公共住房，制定详尽的规则和销售条件来规范这些组屋的分配方式，并建立相关制度和政策，使公共住房负担得起且实现全民拥有住房，这一切就不可能实现。

然而，在落实公共住房计划时，我们认识到经济原则，并利用市场机制来实现全民拥屋，以及为新加坡人提供优质、负担得起的公共住房的总体政治和社会目标。

例如，我们设立建屋发展局作为建造和销售组屋的法定机构，而不是通过政府部门或机构来做这项工作。

当建屋局需要土地建造组屋时，它必须以公平的市场价值向国家购买土地。这体现以下几点：将土地用于公共住房存在机会成本；土地是一种具有价值的稀缺资源；且价值可以也应当客观地确定，并计入组屋的成本中。这为建屋局提供正确的定价信号和激励机制，使它能够充分并优化利用用于公共住房建设的土地。

建屋局并非自行设计或建造所有组屋。它设计部分组屋以保留核心专业知识，但让私人领域的建筑师和建筑公司投标大部分项目。这使建屋局能够利用在竞争市场中运营的私人领域固有的灵活性、效率和创新。这有助于建屋局保持低成本，并提供物有所值的住房。

组屋建成后，便出售给公众。为实现拥屋、让人们负担得起，以及社会和种族融合等社会目标，建屋局对购屋者施加限制，并对屋主必须遵守的条件作出规定。

但关键的问题是如何为组屋定价。

根据政策，组屋以低于市场价值的价格出售，以使它更负担得起，并帮助家庭为退休积累储蓄。

但并非所有同类型组屋都具有相同价值。具体单位的位置、朝向以及楼层，都会产生影响。

建屋局必须考虑到这一市场现实，并据此为每个组屋单位定价。通过统筹规划整体供应，建屋局便能为各个收入群体提供负担得起的组屋，购房者也能在预算范围内，挑选符合自己偏好的组屋。我们避免巨大的、不公平的意外之财，随意地落入少数幸运儿手中，因为若所有同类型组屋都定价相同，便会发生此情况。

组屋出售后，新屋主须住满最低居住年限（Minimum Occupation Period）。但拥屋终究意味着，当一个人的生活状况改变时，能够出售自己的组屋并可能购买另一套。

要如何做到这一点呢？

我们不希望建屋局成为这些二手交易的仲裁者和管理者。因此，我们不要求屋主将组屋回售给建屋局，然后再向建屋局申请另一套组屋。相反，我们允许住户在二手转售市场上买卖他们的组屋，价格由你情我愿的双方设定。为维护关键的社会目标，我们仍设有一些限制和干预措施。例如，只有公民和永久居民可以购买转售组屋；每户家庭在任何时候只能拥有一套组屋；组屋必须由屋主自住，并且只有在符合严格条件时才能整间出租；组屋和邻里层面的种族比例必须保持；政府为符合条件的家庭提供一些津贴。但总体而言，对转售组屋的限制和干预远少于新组屋。

这个做法创造一个多元化但相互关联的全国住房市场，从以市场折扣价直接从建屋局购买的组屋，到在二手市场以市场价格交易但受建屋局规则约束的转售组屋，再到更自由买卖的私人房产。这种多元选择，让屋主能够在人生的不同阶段，灵活地升级或降级住房，并使他们得以兑现组屋的真正市场价值，同时维护关键的社会目标。

医疗保健

另一个例子是医疗保健。

大多数现代社会都将医疗保健视为关键的社会安全网、基本需求，甚至是一项人权。但它也是一个备受争议的问题，因信息不对称、委托人与代理人问题，以及激励机制失衡而导致的市场失灵现象屡见不鲜。如果任其发展，医疗保健行业往往会出现过度开药、过度服务、过度消耗以及服务质量不足的情况。

发达国家在医疗保健方面采取不同的做法。一个极端是美国，它在医疗服务和医疗保险方面，都高度依赖自由市场和私人供应商。但尽管成本高昂，这并未能取得令人满意的成效。医疗资源的获取极不平等，许多家庭根本无力承担。

另一个极端是英国，它高度依赖公共部门。国民医疗服务体系（National Health Service）提供国有化医疗保健，在就医时免费，由纳税人支付。理论上，所有英国居民都能负担得起并获得医疗保健。但实际上，资源有限，医疗保健通过排队配给。等待时间很长，有时长达数年，这损害护理质量并引起相当大的不满。它也没有什么动力来提高效率和削减管理费用。

新加坡则是制定由公私领域共同参与的混合解决方案，旨在通过经济激励措施来产生预期结果。

政府是主要的提供者。但它不通过政府部门或机构提供护理服务。相反，它创建三个自主的公共医疗集群，运营11家急症医院和各种其他公共医疗机构，如综合诊疗所。

这些公共医疗机构以非营利方式运营。它们收取费用并获得津贴，但被要求覆盖成本。它们的使命不是利润最大化，而是在关注成本的同时，向民众提供优质、成本效益高的医疗保健。它们提供无津贴和有津贴的医疗保健，两者的区别在于医生选择权、舒适度和等待时间。

然而，即便是有津贴的医疗服务，病患也始终须要共同支付至少一部分治疗费用。在就医时，没有任何服务是免费的。这旨在体现他们的医疗消费的价值，并遏制对治疗、手术和处方药的过度需求。这是人民行动党政府从一开始就秉持的基本理念。

但共同支付机制只有在病患真正负担得起的情况下才能奏效。因此，政府设立保健储蓄（MediSave），这是一项全国强制性医疗储蓄计划，人们在工作期间缴纳并积累资金，用于支付医疗费用。这些储蓄须要辅以风险分担机制，以防范意外的高额医疗费用。有鉴于此，政府后来设立健保双全（MediShield，后成为终身健保 MediShield Life），作为一项全国基本医疗保险计划。它的主要特点包括自付额（deductible）、共同支付（co-payment，即共同承担额 co-insurance）和索赔限额。这些措施不仅对于保持保费低廉是必要的，而且也降低医疗保险计划中常见的过度消费风险。

私人领域在新加坡的医疗保健体系中也发挥着重要作用。私人运营的全科医生诊所，服务于大部分基层医疗保健市场。对于那些更注重舒适度与选择权，且愿意为此付费的人群而言，私人医院提供除公立医疗机构之外的另一种选择。我们也允许购买私人医疗保险，包括综合健保计划（Integrated Shield Plan）和增强终身健保计划的附加险（rider），为希望扩大保障范围的人群提供更多选择。

但是，我们并未放任私人领域完全不受约束地发展，因为私人医疗保健的市场行为和市场失灵，不可避免地会影响公共医疗保健体系。例如，我们公布涵盖常见外科手术和疾病的私人医院综合收费基准，以提高价格透明度并遏制过度收费。我们也干预私人保险市场，以规范综合健保计划和附加险的设计，这些计划和附加险因“自助餐心态”（buffet syndrome）、更高索赔和更高保费的恶性循环，而持续面临市场失灵的风险。

管理医疗保健体系并非一劳永逸，而是一个动态过程。它须要持续维护，尤其因为它并非一个简单的单一支付方系统。病患、医生、医疗机构和保险业者都会对政策和规则作出反应，改变他们的行为，这要求我们的政策和规则不断适应。随着人口老龄化，疾病负担和医疗需求不断变化，医疗保健体系也必须随之改变。与此同时，医学科学不断发明新颖的技术和疗法。我们须要研究如何提供、资助和分配这些技术和疗法。

尽管如此，我们采取的混合方法——结合政府和私人领域提供服务，辅以积极的监管和对定价及经济激励措施的审慎运用，并置于政府设定的总体框架内——为新加坡人提供优质的医疗保健，且成本低于大多数其他国家。

公共部门薪酬

公共住房和医疗保健是利用市场力量和激励机制提供公共服务的例子。

但是，公共部门也需要市场经济的投入。它必须为这些投入付费，因此与其他经济领域一样，受到相同的经济和市场现实的制约。例如，当政府部门消耗水或电时，须要支付与其他消费者相同的费用和税款。当官员出差时，即使乘坐的是国家航空公司新加坡航空，也须支付与其他旅客相同的机票费用。

然而，公共部门最重大的、最重要的投入要素，是人员。

要提供良好治理和优质公共服务，需要一支高素质的公务员队伍。这取决于在各个层级拥有能干、有担当和称职的公务员。公共服务部门必须吸引、招聘、培训、发展和留住这样的人才。

这里所面对的经济现实，是公共服务部门也参与到全国劳动力市场中。它与许多其他雇主竞争具备所需技能和能力的人才。潜在应聘者可以在公共部门与私人领域之间作出职业选择。在职官员也是如此，尤其是在经济繁荣时期。

因此，我们采纳的政策是，公共部门将提供与私人领域相比，具竞争力的职业发展路径和薪酬。我们参照私人领域的同等职位，在工作范围、能力、贡献和职责等方面进行比较，以此作为公共部门薪酬的基准。这一原则适用于所有层级，从基层公务员到高级领导人，甚至政务官。这是吸引和留住优秀公务员的切实有效方式。这是新加坡能够建立并维持一支廉洁、能干、尽职尽责的公务员队伍的关键原因。

当然，公共服务并非私人企业。公务员必须秉持公共服务的精神。他们选择政府工作并非为了谋取私利，但他们的价值和贡献仍须得到适当认可和公平回报。

在大多数国家，公共服务部门的工资远低于私人领域。普遍的看法是，由于财政和政治上的制约，政府无力支付与私人领域相当的工资。为缓解这一问题，公务员会获得实物福利，例如住房、医疗福利、差旅费津贴、就业保障或优厚的养老金计划。但尽管有这些福利，如果没有合理薪酬，就很难维持公共服务的质量。腐败往往因此成为根深蒂固、难以解决的问题。

新加坡大体上取消这些福利，转而向公务员支付具竞争力的“裸薪”。

这种模式之所以不同寻常，或许是因为它在实践中不容易很好地执行。在私人领域，盈利状况备受关注，业绩往往能很快且切实地显现出来。评估一个人的能力或贡献、支付他们应得的报酬，以及在表现不佳时予以解雇，这些都不难做到。公共部门则缺乏同样的财务压力和信号。它须要处理许多无形、复杂且长期的问题，成功难以量化，后果往往要多年后才会显现。这使得公共部门很难像私人领域那样严格执行绩效纪律。然而，在公共部门对个人和组织的绩效严格评估并予以奖励，是支付公务员合理薪酬的重要补充。这始终是新加坡公共服务部门持续关注的焦点。

通过定价分配稀缺资源

除了公共住房、医疗保健和公共部门薪酬，经济原则和市场激励措施也与许多其他公共政策息息相关。

其中一个广泛领域是通过定价来分配稀缺资源，而不是由政府决定谁最需要这些资源。

对于大多数商品和服务而言，这并无争议。这就是市场经济的运作方式——如果你买手机，你只须支付所选品牌和型号的标价。如果你要理发或装修房屋，你选择服务提供商并支付市价。即使是政府机构提供的服务，例如办理护照或执照，人们通常也接受支付服务费用。

当资源稀缺是由政府行为造成时，定价机制的使用就比较会引发争议。政府可能出于某些政策原因刻意限制资源供应，例如我们对赌场入场和拥车证的管控。当稀缺资源是基本必需品，如饮用水时，也可能发生这种情况。在这种情况下，有人主张应通过行政手段将这些资源分配给需求最迫切的人群，而非依靠价格机制。

然而，即便在这些情况下，最简洁、最公平的资源分配方式往往就是为其定价。这样，资源便会流向真正最珍视它的人，而非仅仅是口头声称需要的人。我们避免作出主观判断和制定繁琐规则，来界定谁更应得到资源的必要性。我们也避免监管围绕有关资源的灰色或非法二手市场交易。消费者显露出的偏好，会产生正确的价格信号，引导生产和消费，使我们能够最有效地利用资源。

这项原则虽存在局限性，但它是一个非常好的初步解决方案。我们已在许多领域运用它，甚至包括一些意想不到的领域。

赌场入场费

例如，2010年我们批准在新加坡开设包括赌场的综合度假胜地时，目标是提振旅游业和刺激经济增长。外国人自然可以免费进入赌场。但新加坡居民呢？

我们并不想完全禁止居民进入赌场。一些本地客源对于营造合适的氛围和人气至关重要。而且，居民本来也很容易接触到赌博，例如到邻国或乘坐到公海的邮轮。赌场设在市中心固然提供更便捷的赌博方式，但风险并没有发生根本性改变。不过，我们也不希望赌场极大地助长本地赌博风气，加剧民众的问题赌博。

因此，我们决定限制居民进入赌场的人数。这使得赌场入场成为稀缺资源。问题是如何分配它：谁应被允许入场，谁应被排除，以及如何排除？

少数几种排除情况是明确的：接受政府经济援助或法律援助的人；居住在租赁组屋单位的人；尚未解除破产状态的人；以及家属已为他们申请禁门令或自愿申请禁门令的人。

但除了这些群体，还有许多其他看似合理的排除对象：有年幼子女（多年幼？）的父母；低收入者（多低？）；前罪犯（何种罪行？）。我们将不得不为通过法令排除某个特定群体是否公平或必要，以及界限应划在哪里，进行无休止的争论。

我们采取了一个简单的解决方案：定价，明确排除少数几个显而易见的群体。除此之外，我们对居民征收赌场入场费，由政府收取，以劝阻而非阻止人们进入赌场。这避免对谁更容易沉迷赌博、谁更有“资格”进入赌场的任意判断。同时，这也有效限制进入赌场的居民人数。

赌场入场收费效果显著。综合度假胜地蓬勃发展，创造大量就业机会和可观的经济活动。居民可以、也确实会去赌场，但并未出现人潮涌动的情况。90%的赌场顾客是游客。居民中的问题赌博率一直保持在1%的低位且稳定。

我们可能是世界上第一个采取这种非常规解决方案的国家。现在，越南、日本、菲律宾和欧盟都在考虑效仿。

拥车证

政府为实现政策目标而刻意制造稀缺性的另一个领域是拥车。

城市国家的道路空间本就稀缺，交通拥堵是一个长期存在的问题。

为保持交通畅通，我们决定通过配额制度直接控制车辆数量。个人或企业若要购买或拥有一辆车，就必须获得拥车证，这是一张授权在固定年限内拥有车辆的准证。

一旦车辆数量以这种方式受限，拥车权就成为一种稀缺而宝贵的资源。那么问题来了：谁应获得拥车证？

有人可能认为，这一稀缺资源应根据对个人需求的评估来分配。例如，有些人需要电单车或汽车来工作，另一些人需要汽车来接送年幼孩子、年迈父母或残障家庭成员，公司则需要车辆来开展业务。

问题在于，每个人的需求各不相同，而且对每个人来说都至关重要。政府很难决定哪些需求应获得特殊考量——这类决定本质上带有主观性。此外，不能保证一旦拥车权被分配给那些声称急需车辆的人，他们不会转售这一宝贵资产，以便购买他们实际上更需要的东西。

因此，我们决定通过招标的方式分配拥车证。这样，稀缺资源便流向那些能从中获得最大价值的人，因为他们最愿意且有能力为此付费，而政府则可以收取因拥车证数量有限而产生的稀缺价值。正如经济学家所说，这一方法也“内部化了外部性”，因为道路上每增加一辆车，都会增加拥堵，给所有其他道路使用者带来额外的延误和成本，而拥车证则让新增车辆的拥有者，在经济上承担这一成本。

这个理念可追溯到吴庆瑞博士，他在1972年首次提出，比我们于1990年推出拥车证计划早很多年。实际落实的拥车证制度，比最初设想的要复杂得多，主要是为了使它在政治上更容易被接受，同时又不损害经济逻辑。但核心理念依然合理，拥车证制度使交通保持畅通，避免困扰许多大城市的交通瘫痪。

水资源

公用事业局供应的饮用水是一个有趣案例，原因很多。

水是生命之源，是人人不可或缺的基本必需品。与此同时，在新加坡，水是一种稀缺资源，也是一个战略和安全问题。来自柔佛州和本地水库的较为廉价的水源已达到容量极限。额外的供应必须来自再循环用水（新生水）或海水淡化，而这两项成本都高得多。这就造成供给曲线向上倾斜，生产水的长期边际成本远高于平均生产成本。这使得节约用水成为国家优先事项。

我们应如何分配这种资源？

一种方法是根据用水量分级定价。为每户家庭的基本用水量设定一个低价格，将此视为基本生活必需品。然后，对超出基本用水量的用水收取更高的费用，以抑制过度用水。公用局多年来一直采用这种方法。

然而，确定基本水量应是多少，是主观且任意的。并非所有家庭都需要全部用水量，有些家庭则需要更多。对于大多数其他生活必需品，如食物或衣物，我们不会决定每个家庭需要多少。人们购买所需要并愿意支付的食物或衣物。其次，大多数家庭都能负担得起全价水费；没有必要提供优惠价格。因此，分级水价会造成显著的无谓收入损失。第三，水价应激励用户从第一滴水就开始就节约用水，而不是仅仅在用水量达到一定程度后才开始。分级水价无法实现这一点。

因此，从经济角度来看，正确的做法是设定统一的水价，价格并非等于平均生产成本，而是等于更高的长期边际成本。然后，我们从所有用户消费的第一滴水开始，就收取相同的价格，而不分级定价。这将反映水的实际稀缺价值，并为所有家庭和企业节约用水（无论用水量多少）创造适当的经济激励。这也确保为增加水供应（通过新生水或海水淡化）而进行的额外投资，在财政上可行且具经济效益。

这就是新加坡为水定价的方式。水费反映公用局的平均生产成本，包括资本成本。此外，用户也须支付耗水费（Water Conservation Tax）给政府，使最终价格达到长期边际成本。

公用事业局于1997年改用这种方法。这意味着两年内水价将上涨三倍。为了在政治上可行，我们将价格上涨与一项名为水电费回扣（U-Save）的计划结合起来，为低收入家庭提供有针对性的经济援助。水电费回扣是长期边际成本定价政策不可或缺的一部分，对成功至关重要。

水电费回扣的设计理念类似于现金。回扣会直接抵扣住户的水电费账单。它不仅可用于支付水费，还可用于支付电费及其他公用事业费用。回扣额取决于住房类型（作为家庭收入的替代指标），较小型组屋获得的回扣较多。但回扣额与实际用水量或用电量无关。如果未立即用完，余额可结转到下一个账单周期。因此，与水费或电费折扣不同，水电费回扣不会促使住户为了享受优惠，而过度用水或让灯开着。总的来说，这种方法确保中低收入家庭仍能够负担得起这一必需品，同时又不扭曲围绕水的生产和消费的经济激励，而这种激励应适用于所有人。

定价公平吗？

对通过定价分配稀缺资源的一种批评是，这样做不公平。

有人认为，富裕阶层总占有优势，因为他们更有能力，也更愿意为这些资源付费。但这不仅适用于赌场入场、拥车证或水，也适用于市场经济中所有买卖的商品和服务。然而，对于绝大多数商品和服务，大多数政府并未用基于能力或需求的分配方式，取代自由市场来加以干预。这是有充分理由的。共产主义的理想——各尽所能，按需分配——违背人性，在实践中也从未奏效。

在人类社会中，收入或财富的完全平等是不可能的，甚至是不可取的，尽管极度不平等可以成为一个严重的问题。

但是，要减少不平等现象，不能采用基于个人的非价格型方案，即通过行政手段将每一种稀缺资源分配给被认为最应得到的人。

相反，应该实施累进税收和收入转移制度，并将税收收入用于为所有人提供高质量的公共产品。富裕家庭缴纳的税款将远远超过他们获得的政府服务和福利，而低收入家庭从政府获得的服务和福利将远远超过他们缴纳的税款。

如果对某种稀缺资源进行定价会对贫困家庭造成过大的影响，那么解决办法是创造更实惠的替代品，或向有需要的人提供有针对性的经济援助。

因此，在通过招标分配拥车证的同时，我们也提供了拥车之外的良好选择：高效的公共交通系统，以及具有竞争力的私召车及德士行业。在对水的稀缺价值收取合理费用的同时，我们也向需要经济援助的家庭提供水电费回扣。（无须制定计划来帮助那些无力支付赌场入场费的人。）这样，我们既能保持价格信号和激励机制，引导每种稀缺资源或产品的生产和消费，又能保持政策的简洁明了，并能更精准有效地提供援助。

提供援助时，现金或类似现金的形式更好

通过水电费回扣帮助家庭应对水价上涨，体现了另一个基本的经济原则：在提供援助时，现金或类似现金的礼券，比价格折扣或实物援助更有效。受益者可使用现金或礼券，购买他们真正需要和想要消费的物品，而不是由他人定义他们的需求和享有权，这样我们既避免了扭曲经济激励机制，又尊重受益者的喜好和自主权。

从理论上讲，现金和类现金之间，现金是更优的选择，因为它给予受益者充分的灵活性，可以花在他们最需要的东西上，而政府为此付出的成本不会比发放礼券更高。

但在实践中，类现金的形式往往更好，就像水电费回扣一样。这是因为礼券更容易被记住，并保留了与援助目的的心理联系，尤其是在受益者必须有意识地做一些事情才能使用礼券时，如在应用中点击操作。现金则会混入受益者的其他资金中，使他们难以将援助与目的联系起来。他们可能不记得，甚至没有意识到自己获得了援助，特别是如果现金援助是自动且无声无息地存入他们的银行账户中。

我们也已将此原则应用于其他形式的援助。

消费税补助券

消费税补助券是政府向低收入家庭提供的一种援助，以抵消消费税。补助券包括现金、保健储蓄填补、水电费回扣和服务与杂费回扣。

在1994年推出消费税时，我们将它设计为单一统一税率，同时辅以消费税补助券及其他措施，减轻低收入家庭的负担。每次消费税税率上调时，我们都会再次发放消费税补助券。最初，这是一项一次性、临时性的措施，此后已成为一项永久性计划。

另一种方法是实施多重消费税税率，对必需品和服务实行较低甚至零税率。许多实行消费税或增值税的国家都采取这种方法，因为从政治上来讲，这更容易让人接受。

但这种方法成本更高且效果较低。大部分放弃的税收收入并未惠及低收入家庭，因为高收入家庭在食品和衣物等“必需”的商品和服务上的支出更多，因此他们才是从这些商品和服务税收减免中真正受益最大的群体。

此外，由于税率多重，政府就无法避免作出武断的区分，也无法避免就哪些商品和服务应享有较低税率而进行无谓的诉讼。若苹果和橙子是“必需”的水果（零税率），为什么鳄梨（须缴税）就不是？寿司是生食（零税率）还是熟食（须缴税）？夜总会带异国风的表演（须缴税）是否应被归类为表演艺术（零税率）？这些都是荒谬但真实存在的例子。

单一的消费税税率，结合现金和类现金的转移支付，是帮助低收入家庭更有效、更高效的方式。

社理会邻里购物券

社区发展理事会（CDC）邻里购物券是政府向家庭发放的另一种类现金援助，旨在帮助他们应对生活费。邻里购物券可以在邻里商店、熟食中心或超市使用，但除此之外，我们不规定家庭可以用它做什么。

事实证明，邻里购物券是一种非常受欢迎的政府援助形式。

我们时常收到个人和企业提出将邻里购物券的使用范围，扩大到其他领域的请求，甚至有者要求用现金补助取代它，但我们并未采纳。目前的使用范围已足够广泛，能让家庭只将购物券花在他们原本就会购买的物品，同时又相当集中在食品杂货和日常必需品上，以保持与生活费的明确关联。如果政府改发现金，这种关联就会丧失。

社区援助

社区援助计划也常采纳这种方法。

在我自己的选区，每逢节日，我们都会向贫困家庭赠送礼包，大多是米、食用油和奶粉等食品，都是我们认为受益者会觉得有用的物品。

但我们后来意识到，并非所有贫困家庭都必然需要或珍视相同的物品。

因此，我们改为带受益者去超市购物，给他们一个预算，并用购物券帮助他们支付所选物品（不包括酒类和烟草）。

我们发现居民更喜欢这种方式。他们可以选择真正需要的东西，并且更感激我们的帮助。一位不带感情色彩的经济学家沃尔德福格尔（Joel Waldfogel）会说，这种方式大大减少礼物带来的无谓损失。

我们也观察到一些居民用部分购物券购买更昂贵的物品，如鲍鱼或燕窝，作为犒劳自己的小小节日礼物。我深受感动，也为他们感到高兴。我们无法替他们做出这样的选择。但他们利用我们的援助，获得真正珍视和需要的东西。我很高兴我们赋予他们自主选择的权利，为他们的生活增添一些光彩。

结论

新加坡政府大力干预，以实现重大的公共政策目标。但它也认识到经济现实，并且比其他国家更多地依赖市场力量，有时以非常规的方式，来实现社会和经济目标。

这并不意味着只有经济因素才重要，也不应总是优先考虑经济因素。政府必须权衡经济因素与政治接受度、社会规范或无形目标等其他因素。例如，国庆庆典门票非常抢手，但我们不会拍卖给出价最高者。用于移植的肾脏也很稀缺，但我们并未将人体器官交易合法化。在这两个案例中，国家建设和伦理顾虑凌驾于经济逻辑之上。

然而，根据我的经验，更常见的问题是政府在制定和实施政策时，对经济原则和市场力量不够重视。只有极少数情况下问题恰恰相反——政府在运用经济逻辑时过于纯粹主义，反而伤害更广泛的目标。

本文并未提出任何经济理论上的突破性进展，而是从实践者的角度出发，描述新加坡如何将微观经济学原理应用于现实情境。我们发现三条经验法则尤为实用：一、 在制定和实施政策时，运用经济原则和市场力量；二、在分配稀缺资源时，只须定价；三、在向受益者提供援助时，现金或类现金的形式更为合适。

由于新加坡系统性且广泛地做到这一点，我们的政府规模比大多数国家都要小。无论从经济增长、公平、社会稳定还是公共服务质量来看，结果都证实这是一种可行的方式，不仅能实现国家的经济目标，也能实现社会和政治目标。