SM Lee Hsien Loong at the Launch of the Albatross File Book and Exhibition

Please see below for the Mandarin translation of the English transcript.

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Former President Halimah Yaacob
Emeritus Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong and Mrs Goh
Ministers and Parliamentary colleagues, past and present
Distinguished guests
Ladies and gentlemen

I am honoured and happy to launch the Albatross File exhibition and book, in Singapore’s SG60 year.

I am especially happy that we have with us today Mr Ong Pang Boon – one of the 10 Singapore ministers who signed the Separation Agreement. We have also, family members of the other signatories who are no longer with us. We have Mr Ng Kah Ting – who with Mr Ong are the two surviving members of Singapore’s first Parliament which sat in December 1965, and Dr Lai Tha Chai – who was among the nine candidates the PAP fielded in the 1964 Malaysian General Election.

The main contours of the story of Separation have long been well known. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Prime Minister then, recounted some of it in his 1977 memoirs, Looking Back. More information emerged as British, Australian and New Zealand diplomatic cables and reports of that period were declassified from the early 1990s onwards. Mr Lee Kuan Yew told the story from his perspective in his memoirs, The Singapore Story, relying on some of the same documents we are releasing today, as well as oral histories that he and his close colleagues had recorded in the early 1980s. Historians have also written about Separation. Professor Albert Lau’s definitive account, A Moment of Anguish, appeared in 1998, the same year as Mr Lee’s The Singapore Story.

Still, the core of this book – The Albatross File – is something which has not previously been put out. The file contains important documents from the period, most of which have not been published before. It was created, named, and kept by Dr Goh Keng Swee, then the Minister for Finance. The albatross was Malaysia. Dr Goh felt that Malaysia had become an albatross around Singapore’s neck. He was alluding to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poem, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”.  Those of you who are old enough like me may have studied it at O-Levels.

For a period the file was lost, before being found in a MINDEF storeroom in the early 1980s. It was discovered by Dr Tan Kay Chee, a MINDEF officer who was then interviewing Dr Goh and some of our founding leaders for an oral history project on the political history of Singapore. Dr Goh relied on the file in his own oral history interviews, and read into the record several of the documents in the file. But for Kay Chee’s efforts and fortunate discovery, this precious record might have been lost to history, and we would have been all the poorer for it. The public first learnt of the existence of the file in 1996, after Dr Goh mentioned it in an interview with Dr Melanie Chew for her book Leaders of Singapore.  

The Albatross File gives a vivid sense of what happened – a dramatic, blow-by-blow record of how Singapore came to separate from Malaysia. There are incisive Cabinet papers setting out the fundamental issues at stake, analysing the strategic choices facing the different actors, and describing the state of political play after merger with Malaysia. There are specific proposals on how Singapore might achieve a looser federation within Malaysia. There are succinct records of conversations with Malaysian leaders, and British and Australian diplomats. And there are the meticulous handwritten notes by Dr Goh of his meetings with Tun Razak and other Malaysian Ministers to negotiate the Separation Agreement.

When I was Prime Minister, I decided that the Albatross File should be declassified and published. Together with the file, I also decided to publish relevant extracts from the oral histories of key participants involved in Separation, to bring together and put on the public record a full documented account of this seminal event in our independence journey.  

A team – which included later Susan Sim, Albert Lau and Tan Tai Yong – went through the material carefully, picked out the key documents and sections, annotated them, and wrote up the editorial apparatus – introductions, prefaces and footnotes.

This book is the result of their considerable labours. The reader will not only understand the actions and events that led to Separation, but will also feel the emotions and passions of our founding fathers. It is a history well-worth publishing.

Was Singapore kicked out?

The key question concerning Separation is this: “Was Singapore kicked out by Malaysia, or did we seek Separation?” Originally, the prevailing view was: “We were kicked out”. The Tunku himself said at the time that the decision to kick Singapore out of Malaysia had been taken by him, solely.

But of course such an earthshaking – and at that time, unexpected – outcome could not have had a simple or singular cause. The Tunku certainly was a decisive figure in Separation. But many factors forced his hand and led him to conclude that letting Singapore go was the best option, for him and for Malaysia.

Not least was the intense political campaign that Mr Lee and others in the Singapore leadership mounted to fight for a “Malaysian Malaysia”. As Dr Goh observed in his oral history, after the July 1964 race riots in Singapore, Mr Lee decided on a counter-offensive, “at great risk to himself”. “It was Lee’s policy,” Goh said, “that if we were to get good terms out of [the Malaysian leadership], either total separation or a new working arrangement [within Malaysia], that they [the federal authorities] must find existing arrangements intolerable”.

So, Mr Lee brought enormous political pressure to bear on the federal government. There was the crucial speech in the Malaysian Parliament on the 27^th of May 1965, where Mr Lee spoke in fluent Malay – you can hear the speech in the exhibition. The Tunku later described that speech as “the straw that broke the camel’s back”. And there was the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, that Dr Toh Chin Chye and Mr Rajaratnam had initiated, which held rallies up and down the peninsula. At the first rally at the National Theatre in Singapore on the 6^th of June, Mr Lee gave another powerful speech. You can hear that too.

Those were very tense days. Mr Lee was aware that the federal authorities were considering arresting him, and that he was in grave peril. But as he told Britain’s High Commissioner to Malaysia, Antony Head, he would not – he could not – back down. And as Antony Head noted, there was considerable truth and force in what Mr Lee said.

I was 13 years old then. One day, on the Istana golf course, he told me that if anything were to happen to him, I should look after my mother and younger siblings. Fortunately, as we later learned, the British Prime Minister then, Harold Wilson, had warned the Tunku that the UK would have to reconsider its relations with Malaysia if he arrested Mr Lee. So by the end of June 1965, the Tunku had decided that it would be best to “return Singapore to Lee Kuan Yew” instead.

The Tunku’s decision led to the talks between Razak and Dr Goh from mid-July onwards. Within three weeks, the Separation Agreement was drafted, signed, and Singapore was on its own. The albatross had finally loosed off our neck. As many historians have since characterised it, Separation was a mutually negotiated outcome.

But it was not the outcome that Mr Lee preferred. The Albatross File, as well as the oral histories, present evidence that Mr Lee was quite torn about Separation. Indeed, it was Mr Lee’s counter strategy that forced the Tunku’s hand. And it was he who directed Mr Barker to draft the Separation documents, soon after Dr Goh’s first meeting with Razak on the 15^th of July. But his aim was to strengthen Singapore’s position politically, so as to compel the federal government to grant Singapore greater autonomy.

Mr Lee recounted in his oral history and in his memoirs, how in the talks between Dr Goh and Razak, he had instructed Dr Goh to press for a looser constitutional re-arrangement within Malaysia, and that Separation was to be an option only if Singapore could not get such a re-arrangement. But Dr Goh came back to report that “Razak wanted a total hiving off”. Mr Lee accepted this, and took decisive steps that enabled Separation – which he called a “bloodless coup” – to happen.

Yet till the very end, Mr Lee was ambivalent. On the 3^rd of August, when he was on holiday with the family in Cameron Highlands, Dr Goh telephoned him to report on his latest meeting with Razak, and to confirm that Separation was on. In those days, calls to Cameron Highlands had to go through telephone operators, who mostly did not speak Chinese. So Dr Goh and Mr Lee spoke in Mandarin – not Dr Goh’s strongest language.

I remember that phone call. I was in the room at Cluny Lodge when my father took the call that afternoon, and I heard him tell Dr Goh in Mandarin, “This is a huge decision; let me think about it.” I did not know then what it was about, but it became plain soon enough. This was less than a week before Separation Day.

And even on the 7^th of August, after Dr Goh and Mr Barker had settled the Agreement with Tun Razak, Mr Lee saw the Tunku again to ask if they could have a looser federation instead – perhaps even a confederation. It was the Tunku who said flatly that it was over. I remember sleeping that night (on the 7^th of August) on the floor in the corner of my parents’ bedroom at Temasek House in Kuala Lumpur, before the family drove back to Singapore the next day. My father got up repeatedly throughout the night to write notes to himself.

This explains Mr Lee’s state of mind at Separation, and why at the press conference on the 9^th of August he broke down, and spoke about “a moment of anguish.” My mother said in her oral history that that was the closest he came to a nervous breakdown.

Decades later, when Mr Lee was preparing his memoirs, he obtained Dr Goh’s permission to read his oral history. It was only then that Mr Lee discovered that contrary to his instructions, Dr Goh had, from the start, gone for a clean break, and never tried for the looser federation which Mr Lee preferred, and had instructed him to try for. Mr Lee was so astonished that he made note of the exact time, date and place when he first learnt this. In the margin of the transcript of Dr Goh’s oral history, next to the passage where Dr Goh confirmed that it was he, and not Razak, who had suggested Separation, Mr Lee wrote: “1^st time read on 22 Aug ’94, 5.40 pm in the office”. Mr Lee had been trained as a lawyer! Mr Lee told some of the Ministers about this, and his great surprise at what had really happened. He also spoke to me about it. You can see this page with Mr Lee’s marginal note in the exhibition.

In 1977, when the Tunku sent Mr Lee a copy of his memoirs Looking Back, he inscribed on the flyleaf: “To Mr Lee Kuan Yew – The friend who had worked so hard to found Malaysia and even harder to break it up.” The first half of the sentence was true enough – Mr Lee had indeed worked hard to achieve merger with Malaysia. But the second half was incorrect. Rather than a break with Malaysia, Mr Lee’s aim was a more secure and workable constitutional arrangement for Singapore within Malaysia.

Mr Lee felt torn. On the one hand, he felt deeply his responsibility to the Singaporeans whom he had persuaded to merge with Malaysia. On the other hand, he felt keenly his obligation to all those in the rest of the Federation, whom he and the Malaysian Solidarity Convention had mobilised to fight for a Malaysian Malaysia. It weighed heavily on him that he was abandoning and letting down the millions left behind when Singapore separated.

On his part, Dr Goh was convinced that merger was doomed and that the Malaysian leaders themselves wanted us out. Hence, when he negotiated with Razak, he pressed for total separation, assuring Razak that Mr Lee would be amenable to the idea.

Thankfully, the stars were aligned. Within a few years of Separation, all our founding leaders – especially Mr Lee, and even those like Mr Rajaratnam, Dr Toh, and Mr Ong who had signed the Separation Agreement most reluctantly – concluded that Separation was the best thing that ever happened to Singapore. In this SG60 year, we are very glad that Dr Goh did what he did. Singapore has thrived and progressed far beyond anything the Founding Fathers imagined.

It was far from inevitable that events would turn out this way. In all likelihood, had Separation not been achieved on the 9^th of August 1965, sooner or later the breakup would somehow have occurred – but most probably not as peacefully. The contradictions between the two societies were so profound that they could not have been resolved without a parting of ways.

Four Leaders

Four men were key to bringing Separation about. On the Malaysian side, the Tunku and his deputy Tun Razak. On ours, Mr Lee and Dr Goh.

If Tunku had not decided on Separation early, and remained firm in that decision, it would not have happened. Mr Lee said Tunku was decisive – not a “ditherer”. Dr Goh said he was a man “who can think in terms of big and serious things”.

In contrast, Razak often changed his mind. Fortunately, he got along with Dr Goh, the two having known each other since their student days in London. And Razak was friends with Mr Barker too – they had played hockey together in Raffles College. That basic trust between key figures on both sides, despite their deep political differences, enabled a peaceful Separation, unlike many other partitions and breakups of the post-colonial era.

On Singapore’s side, Dr Goh was the “Architect of Separation”, as Mr Barker called him. In Dr Goh’s own words:

“I’d had enough of Malaysia. I just wanted to get out. I could see no future in it, the political cost was dreadful and the economic benefits, well, didn’t exist. So it was an exercise in futility. … it was a project that should be abandoned once you saw that it was worthless.”

Between 15 July, when Dr Goh first met Tun Razak, and the early hours of the 7th of August, when the Separation Agreement was settled, Dr Goh was intent solely on one goal: Singapore and Malaysia going their separate ways. He handled the negotiations brilliantly. He sensed his Malaysian counterparts wanted Singapore out too, and assiduously fed that desire. He adroitly avoided what he considered distractions, including the possibility of a looser federation. He stiffened Razak’s resolve when Razak wavered, reminding him of the painful alternatives to “hiving off”. He also committed Mr Lee to Separation by asking for a letter authorising him to negotiate constitutional re-arrangements with Malaysian leaders. And he did not tell Mr Lee that he was not pursuing any of the other possible re-arrangements which Mr Lee had instructed him to press for, except one – Separation.  

And finally, Mr Lee. Separation was not his preferred outcome. But he supported Dr Goh in the negotiations, and supervised Mr Barker to include key clauses in the Separation documents. He went to great lengths to persuade all his Ministers to sign the Separation Agreement, so there was no Cabinet split, and independent Singapore started out with a strong, united leadership team. At the strategic level, it was the political pressure that Mr Lee orchestrated, the international stature that he had built up, and the courage and leadership that he showed, which compelled the Tunku to let Singapore go.

Lasting Lessons

Had Mr Lee shown any signs of being afraid, or being willing to bend, we would have been rolled over. Singaporeans saw Mr Lee stand up to the radicals in UMNO – the “Ultras”, as he called them. They knew he could not be intimidated. They realised that he was prepared to risk all, including his life, to secure their future. It was through this experience of Merger followed by Separation that Mr Lee and the PAP solidified their support among our Pioneer Generation.

Mr Lee was not the only Singapore leader to show courage in the crisis. In the week before Dr Goh’s first meeting with Razak, two significant events happened. The meeting was on the 15^th of July, but first, on the 8^th of July, several key PAP ministers – Dr Toh Chin Chye, Dr Goh, Mr Barker and Mr Lim Kim San – held a press conference to declare that they stood with Mr Lee, and would not “quietly acquiesce” if Mr Lee were detained.

Then, on the 10^th of July, there was a by-election in Hong Lim constituency. Singapore’s leaders believed the federal authorities had engineered this by-election to test the PAP’s support. The PAP had lost Hong Lim twice before. This time, it fielded Lee Khoon Choy as its candidate. It campaigned on the issue of a Malaysian Malaysia. And Khoon Choy won, with 60% of the votes. These two events surely convinced the federal leaders, especially the Ultras, that they could not cow or suppress Mr Lee and his team, and hence they were better off with Singapore out of the Federation.

Trust in Government, and in the political leadership in particular, is founded on the people knowing their leaders will always have their backs. That is one important lesson from our two years in Malaysia. Our founding leaders won the right to govern because Singaporeans were convinced that Mr Lee and his team could not be intimidated into compromising Singapore’s interests. His successors have not forgotten this lesson. No Singapore PM has ever allowed any force or power, whether foreign or domestic, to intimidate us into compromising our national interest or sovereignty.

The other enduring lesson is never to take our racial and religious harmony for granted. From September 1963, when the PAP won all three Malay-majority seats in the general elections, till July 1964, when Singapore was engulfed in race riots, was only 10 months. Within this brief period, the Ultras succeeded in sowing deep distrust between the Malays and Chinese. Asked for his most vivid memories of the two years in Malaysia, Mr Lee said:

“First, how easy it is to arouse communal passions. That once you get people excited over race differences, language differences, religious differences, and they start butchering … or maiming each other, distrust and fear seeps through the whole community. And I watched with despair and dismay that so much work to bring the races together [over] so many years could be wrecked in such a short time…

So when I look at the new housing estates where we’ve mixed them all up, I have never allowed myself to forget that this air of inter-racial harmony and trust is very fragile. It can be snapped, broken, smashed. … the dynamics of communal politics or communal politicking will override reason and logic.”

We separated from Malaysia because of identity politics based on race and religion. We will never allow race or religion to break up Singapore.

Conclusion

Many Singaporeans today look at Separation as a distant memory. Indeed, they wonder why some of our leaders were so conflicted about leaving Malaysia. Isn’t it obvious that what happened was inevitable and right? Why the tears?

But at the time, when the issue was live and the stakes were huge, it was far from obvious that Singapore should be independent, or had such a future. For those who lived through those times, each step was uncertain, each negotiation harrowing, each decision wrenching. Neither our founding leaders nor the people they led could be certain Singapore would survive, let alone thrive, as an independent island-nation. As Mr Lee once said, he was glad he did not have to live through again the 23 months from Merger to Separation. He wasn’t sure we would be so lucky as to emerge intact again from those terrifying times.

I encourage Singaporeans, young and old, to experience through this book and exhibition how on the 9^th of August 1965, Singapore came to be “forever a sovereign democratic and independent nation”. You will realise it was hardly foreordained. It was – and still is – a miracle.

Thank you.

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Mandarin translation of the English speech

我很荣幸和高兴能在新加坡建国60周年之际，为《信天翁档案》常设展和书籍主持开幕和发布仪式。

尤其令我高兴的是，今天我们有幸邀请到王邦文先生——签署《分家协定》的10位新加坡部长之一。我们也有其他已故签署者的家属在现场。此外，黄嘉腾先生——他与王邦文先生是1965年12月召开的新加坡第一届国会中仍在世的两位前议员，以及黎达材博士——他是人民行动党在1964年马来西亚大选中派出的九名候选人之一，也莅临现场。

关于新马分家故事的主要脉络，早已广为人知——时任马来西亚首相东姑阿都拉曼在他的1977年回忆录《回顾》（Looking Back）中，曾讲述了其中一部分。随着英国、澳大利亚和新西兰在1990年代初开始解密当年的外交电报和报告，更多信息浮出水面。李光耀先生则在他的回忆录《风雨独立路——李光耀回忆录（1923-1965）》中，依据我们今天公布的部分相同文件，以及他和他的亲密同僚在1980年代初录制的口述历史，从自己的视角叙述了这段历史。历史学家也曾撰文探讨新马分家，刘华坤副教授的权威性记述《悲痛的一刻》（A Moment of Anguish）和《李光耀回忆录》于1998年一起面世。

然而，《信天翁档案》这本书的核心内容，是此前从未公开过的。这份档案收录了当时期的重要文件，其中大部分此前从未发表。它由时任财政部长吴庆瑞博士创建、命名并保存。“信天翁”指的是马来西亚。吴博士认为，马来西亚已成了挂在新加坡脖子上的信天翁。他此言暗指塞缪尔·泰勒·柯勒律治（Samuel Taylor Coleridge）的诗歌《古舟子咏》——像我一样年纪较长的各位，可能在O水准考试时读过这首诗。

这份档案曾一度遗失，直到1980年代初在国防部的一个储藏室中被发现。发现者是陈家琦（Tan Kay Chee，人名译音）博士，她当时是一名国防部官员，正在为一项关于新加坡政治历史的口述历史项目，采访吴博士和一些建国元勋。吴博士在他的口述历史访谈中依据这份档案，并在录音时读了其中的若干文件。要不是家琦的努力和幸运发现，这份珍贵的记录可能已湮没于历史中，我们也将蒙受巨大损失。公众首次得知这份档案的存在是在1996年，当时吴博士在接受吴凤宁博士采访时提及，后者正在为她的著作《新加坡的领袖》进行采访。

《信天翁档案》鲜明地描述了所发生的一切——戏剧性、详尽地记录了新加坡如何与马来西亚分家的全过程。其中有深刻的内阁文件，说明当时涉及的根本性问题，分析不同参与者所面临的战略选择，并形容与马来西亚合并后的政治博弈形势。还有关于新加坡如何与马来西亚实现较松散的联邦的具体建议。档案包含与马来西亚领导人、英国和澳大利亚外交官对话的扼要记录，以及吴博士与敦拉萨及其他马来西亚部长谈判《分家协定》时留下的细致手写记录。

我担任总理时，决定《信天翁档案》应该解密和发布。和这份档案一起，我也决定公开参与分家的关键人物的相关口述历史摘录，把我国独立历程中转捩点事件的完整书面记载汇集起来，放在公开的记录中。

一个团队——其中包括后来的沈丽群、刘华坤和陈大荣——仔细梳理了这些材料，筛选出关键文件和章节，对它们进行注释，并做了引言、序言和脚注的编辑工作。

这本书是他们辛勤努力的成果。读者不仅能理解导致新马分家的行动和事件，更能真切感受到建国元勋们的情感和激情。这是一部极具出版价值的历史著作。

新加坡是被踢出局的吗？

关于分家的关键问题是：“新加坡是被踢出马来西亚的，还是我们寻求分家？”原本的普遍观点是：“我们是被踢出局的。”东姑本人当时也说，将新加坡踢出马来西亚的决定，仅由他一人做出。

但如此令人震惊——且在当时出人意料——的结果，当然不可能仅由一个简单或单一因素造成。东姑无疑是分家过程中的关键人物。但许多因素逼迫，让他最终认定让新加坡脱离，对他和马来西亚而言，是最好的选择。

尤其重要的是，李先生和新加坡其他领导人发起了争取“马来西亚人的马来西亚”的激烈政治运动。正如吴博士在口述历史中所述，1964年7月新加坡发生种族暴动后，李先生决定“冒着极大的个人风险”反制。吴博士说：“李光耀的政策是，如果我们想从（马来西亚领导层）那里获得有利条件，无论是彻底分家还是（在马来西亚内部）达成新的运作安排，他们（联邦政府）就必须认为现有安排无法忍受。”

所以，李先生对联邦政府施加了巨大政治压力。1965年5月27日，他以流利的马来语在马来西亚国会发表了关键演讲——这段演讲可以在常设展中听到。东姑后来将那次演讲形容为“压垮骆驼的最后一根稻草”。还有由杜进才博士和拉惹勒南先生发起的“马来西亚团结大会”（Malaysian Solidarity Convention），该大会在马来半岛各地举行集会。在1965年6月6日新加坡国家剧场举行的首次集会上，李先生又发表了一次强有力的演讲。你也可以在常设展上听到这段演讲。

那是异常紧张的日子。李先生清楚联邦政府正考虑逮捕他，处境很危险。但他告诉英国驻马来西亚最高专员安东尼·赫德，他不会也不能退缩。正如赫德指出，李先生的话包含相当大的真实性和说服力。

我当时13岁。有一天，在总统府的高尔夫球场上，他告诉我，如果他出了什么事，我必须照顾好母亲和年幼的弟妹。庆幸的是，正如我们后来得知，时任英国首相哈罗德·威尔逊曾警告东姑，如果他逮捕李光耀，英国将不得不重新考虑与马来西亚的关系。因此，到1965年6月底，东姑已决定，最好的办法是把新加坡“还给李光耀”。

东姑这一决定促使敦拉萨与吴博士从7月中旬开始商谈。《分家协定》在三周内完成起草和签署，新加坡就此走自己的路。那只“信天翁”终于从我们的脖子上松开。正如许多历史学家后来所描述的，分家是双方协商的结果。

但这并非李先生想要的结果。《信天翁档案》以及口述历史记录均显示，李先生对分家感到相当纠结。事实上，正是李先生的反制策略迫使东姑做出决定。吴博士于1965年7月15日首次会见敦拉萨后不久，是李先生指示巴克先生起草分家文件。但他的目的是从政治上加强新加坡的地位，从而迫使联邦政府给予新加坡更大的自治权。

李先生在他的口述历史和回忆录中曾提及，在吴博士和敦拉萨的会谈中，他曾指示吴博士争取与马来西亚达成较松散的宪制安排，只有在新加坡无法获得此类安排的情况下，分家才是一个选项。但吴博士回来汇报称“敦拉萨要求彻底分离”。李先生接受了这一提议，并采取果断决策促成分家——他称之为一场“不流血的政变”。

然而，直到最后，李先生依然矛盾纠结。8月3日，当他与家人在金马仑高原度假时，吴博士打电话给他，汇报与敦拉萨的最新会谈进展，并确认分家已成定局。在那个年代，打到金马仑高原的电话须要通过接线员转接，而接线员大多不懂华语。因此，吴博士和李先生用华语交谈，而这并非吴博士最擅长的语言。

我记得那通电话。父亲在古鲁尼旅舍（Cluny Lodge）接电话时，我就在房里。我听到他用华语告诉吴博士：“这是个重大的决定，让我考虑。”我起初不知道那是关于什么，但很快便知晓。当时离“分家日”不到一周的时间。

即使到了1965年8月7日，吴博士和巴克已与敦拉萨敲定《分家协定》，李先生还是去见东姑，问他是否可以转而组成更松散的联邦，或甚至邦联。是东姑断然表明，一切都结束了。我记得那天晚上（8月7日）在吉隆坡淡马锡楼（Temasek House）父母卧室一角的地板上睡觉，第二天一家人才开车回新加坡。父亲整晚反复起身写笔记。

这反映了李先生在新马分家时的心境，以及为何在8月9日的记者会上，他会情绪崩溃，形容那是“悲痛的一刻”。母亲在她的口述历史中说，那是父亲最接近精神崩溃的一次。

数十年后，当李先生准备撰写回忆录时，他获得吴博士的许可，得以查阅其口述历史记录。直到那时，李先生才发现，吴博士并没有按照他的指示，而是从一开始就主张彻底分离，从未尝试争取李先生所倾向并指示他去争取的较松散的联邦。李先生对此感到非常震惊，他甚至记下了首次得知此事的确切时间、日期和地点。在吴博士口述历史记录的页边空白处，紧邻吴博士确认是他而非敦拉萨提议分家的段落，李先生写道：“1994年8月22日下午5时40分在办公室首次读到。”李先生曾接受过律师培训！李先生将此事以及他对真正发生的一切的巨大惊讶告诉了一些部长。他也曾与我谈及此事。这页带有李先生旁注的页面，可在常设展看到。

1977年，当东姑将他的回忆录《回顾》寄给李先生时，他在扉页上题字：“致李光耀先生——那位为建立马来西亚辛勤付出，又为拆散它甚至付出更多努力的朋友。”这句话的前半部分确实属实——李先生确实努力促成了与马来西亚的合并。但后半部分是不正确的。李先生的目的并非与马来西亚分家，而是在马来西亚联邦内，为新加坡争取一个更安全、更可行的宪制安排。

李先生的内心倍感煎熬。一方面，他深切感受到自己对那些被他劝说与马来西亚合并的新加坡人的责任。另一方面，他强烈感受到自己对联邦其他地区所有被他与马来西亚团结大会动员起来，为争取“马来西亚人的马来西亚”而奋斗的人感觉到强烈负有义务。当新马分家时，自己正抛弃并辜负了数百万被遗留下来的人，让他深感沉重。

就吴博士而言，他坚信合并注定失败，并且马来西亚领导人也希望我们离开。因此，当他与敦拉萨谈判时，他坚持彻底分家，并向敦拉萨保证李先生会接受这个想法。

值得庆幸的是，时机已到，万事顺遂。在分家后的短短几年内，我们所有的建国元勋——尤其是李先生，甚至包括像拉惹勒南、杜进才和王邦文这些极不愿意在《分家协定》上签字的人都得出结论：分家是新加坡所经历过最好的事情。在新加坡建国60周年之际，我们非常庆幸吴博士当年所做的一切。新加坡的蓬勃发展，成就远超建国元勋们当年的想象。

但事态如此发展，远非必然。极有可能，如果1965年8月9日未能实现分家，迟早会以某种方式发生分裂——但很可能不会如此和平。两国社会之间的矛盾如此深刻，若不分道扬镳，根本无法解决。

四位领导人

四位人物在促成分家中起到了关键作用。马来西亚方面是东姑和他的副手敦拉萨。我们这边则是李先生和吴博士。

如果东姑没有早早决定分家，并坚持这一决定，分家就不会发生。李先生说东姑是果断的人，而非“犹豫不决者”。吴博士说他是一位“能够思考重大而严肃事情”的人。

相比之下，敦拉萨则经常改变主意。幸运的是，他与吴博士相处融洽，两人自伦敦留学时便已相识。敦拉萨与巴克也是朋友——他们曾在莱佛士学院一起打钩球。尽管双方关键人物之间存在深刻的政治分歧，但这种基本信任促成了和平分家，这与后殖民时期的许多其他分裂和解体不同。

在新加坡方面，吴博士是巴克口中“分家的总策划师”。用吴博士自己的话说：“我受够了马来西亚。我只想离开。我看不到它的未来，政治代价是可怕的，而经济利益，嗯，根本不存在。所以这是一项徒劳的尝试……一个一旦发现它毫无价值就应该放弃的项目。”

从1965年7月15日吴博士首次会见敦拉萨，到8月7日凌晨《分家协定》敲定，吴博士的唯一目标是：新加坡和马来西亚分道扬镳。他出色地处理了谈判。他察觉到马来西亚领导人也希望新加坡脱离，并不遗余力地助长这种愿望。他巧妙地避开他认为是干扰的选项，包括建立较松散联邦的可能性。在敦拉萨犹豫不决时，他坚定对方的决心，提醒敦拉萨“彻底分离”之外的痛苦替代结果。他还通过要求一封授权他（吴博士）与马来西亚领导人谈判宪制重新安排的信函，让李先生也致力于分家。而且，他没有告诉李先生，他没有争取李先生指示他去争取的其他任何可能的宪制重新安排方案，除了一个——分家。

最后，对于李先生而言，分家并非他想要的结果。但他支持吴博士进行谈判，并指导巴克在分家文件中加入关键条款。他尽力劝说所有部长签署《分家协定》，从而确保内阁没有分裂，使独立后的新加坡以一个强大、团结的领导团队起步。在战略层面，正是李先生施加的政治压力、他所建立的国际声望，以及他展现出的勇气和领导力，迫使东姑放手让新加坡脱离。

永恒的教训

如果李先生表现出任何害怕或妥协的迹象，我们就会被压垮。

新加坡人看到李先生对抗巫统中的激进分子——他称之为极端分子。他们知道他不可能被吓倒。他们意识到，他已准备好冒着一切，包括生命危险，来保障他们的未来。正是通过合并继而分家的这段经历，李先生和人民行动党巩固了建国一代对他们的支持。

李先生不是唯一在危机中表现出勇气的领导人。在吴博士首次会见敦拉萨前的一周，发生两件重大事件。会面定在1965年7月15日，但首先，在7月8日，几位行动党重要部长——杜进才博士、吴博士、巴克和林金山——举行了记者会，声明他们与李先生站在一起，若李先生被拘留，他们绝不会默默承受。

接着，7月10日，在芳林区举行了一场补选。新加坡领导人认为联邦当局策划这次补选是为了测试行动党的支持度。行动党此前曾两次在芳林区失利。这次，它派出候选人李炯才，并以争取“马来西亚人的马来西亚”为竞选议题。结果，炯才以60%的得票率获胜。这两件事无疑让联邦领导人，特别是“极端分子”，相信他们无法恫吓或压制李先生及其团队，因此，让新加坡脱离联邦对他们而言会更好。

对政府的信任，特别是对政治领导层的信任，是建立在人民知道他们的领导人会永远支持他们的基础上的。这是我们在马来西亚两年学到的重要一课。我们的建国元勋们赢得了执政的资格，因为新加坡人相信李先生及其团队不会被恫吓而妥协新加坡的利益。他的继任者们没有忘记这一课。没有一位新加坡总理曾允许任何势力或强权，不论国外或国内，威胁我们损害国家利益或主权。

另一个永恒的教训是，绝不能将我们的种族和宗教和谐视为理所当然。从1963年9月行动党在大选中赢得所有三个马来人占多数的议席，到1964年7月新加坡陷入种族暴动，仅仅过去了10个月。在这短暂的时期内，“极端分子”成功地在马来人和华人之间播下了深深的不信任种子。当被问及在马来西亚两年最深刻的记忆时，李先生说：

“首先，煽动族群情绪是多么容易。一旦你让人们因种族差异、语言差异、宗教差异而激动起来，他们就会互相残杀……或致残，不信任和恐惧就会渗透到整个社区。我绝望和沮丧地看到，多年来为促进各族群融合所做的如此多的工作，可以在如此短的时间内被摧毁……

所以当我看到新的组屋区，我们让人们混合居住时，我从不允许自己忘记，这种种族和谐与信任的氛围非常脆弱。它随时可能折断、破裂、粉碎……种族政治或种族政治操弄的动能，会凌驾于理性和逻辑之上。”

我们与马来西亚分家，正是因为基于种族和宗教的身份政治。我们永远不会让种族或宗教分裂新加坡。

结论

如今，许多新加坡人把新马分家视为遥远的记忆。他们甚至不解为何一些领导人对脱离马来西亚如此纠结。难道不是显而易见吗？发生的一切既是必然也是正确的选择。何必流泪？

但在当时，当问题悬而未决且风险巨大时，新加坡是否应该独立，或拥有未来，远非显而易见。对经历过那个时代的人来说，每一步都充满不确定性，每次协商都很煎熬，每个决策都很艰辛。无论是我们的建国领导人，或他们所带领的人民，都无法确定，新加坡作为一个独立岛国能否生存，更不用说蓬勃发展。正如李先生曾说，他庆幸自己不必再经历从合并到分家的23个月。他不敢肯定，我们能否如此幸运，再次从那些可怕的岁月中全身而退。

我鼓励所有新加坡人，无论老少，通过这本书和展览来了解新加坡如何在1965年8月9日成为“永远的自主、独立与民主国家“。他们会发现，这绝非命中注定。这曾经是，也依然是个奇迹。